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The French naval blockade of Algeria (1827-1830)

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Abstract:

This research paper aims to study a milestone in the history of Algeria, the period preceding the occupation, which is represented in the naval blockade imposed by France on Algeria between 1827 and 1830AD, as a final station to complete the weakening of Algeria before preparing and sending the military campaign to occupy it. During the study, we will try to clarify Algeria's situation and familiarity with its various aspects to find out the justifications for the siege in achieving French goals, and to highlight the French conspiracy that directed the course of events towards the crisis of relations between Algeria and France, by identifying the facts that led to the outbreak of the fan incident, the direct and apparent cause, as a justification for the siege, while clarifying the reasons for the siege on both sides and reaching its most important results.

Keywords: piracy, debt issue, fan incident, Pierre Duval, privileges.

Introduction

For three centuries, Algeria has been the master of the Mediterranean. It derived its strength from its naval fleet, so the nations turned to it either to invade it through naval campaigns or to appease it by concluding treaties and agreements. With the decline of Algeria and the decline of its power, the European nations scrambled to eliminate it. France was the first to achieve this endeavor, which began with its naval siege of Algeria from 1827 to 1830.

So we ask the question: What are the real motives behind the French naval blockade of Algeria? And what led to it in the end?

Efforts and Rupees (Consensus, Rupees and the French approach)



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The idea of overthrowing the Algerian state is old for Europeans in general and the French in particular, as the French Consul "Kerres " proposed in 1782 the occupation of Algeria and renewed his proposal in 1791 (Bar, Al-Mili, 1965, p. 159). The reasons for the European desire to overthrow Algeria are due to its strength and status, expressed in the annual royalties paid by European countries in exchange for ensuring the safety of their trans-Mediterranean fleets, in addition to the greatness of the Algerian commercial and jihadist fleet, which represented a source of European awe and prestige, as well as the strong and prominent presence of Algeria in various Mediterranean issues. Knight Balkasim, 1985, pp.338-346).

The European endeavor was manifested after the elimination of the Napoleonic Wars in 1814AD, where efforts were united to confront what was termed "piracy and slavery", by taking advantage of the weakness and decadence under which the Ottoman Empire became plagued, as the conference in 1815AD presented the Algerian issue and unanimously refused to pay royalties in exchange for crossing the Mediterranean (Abbad, 2005AD, p. 217), and a project was presented to form a league of maritime states that gather and form a joint maritime force tasked with monitoring the seas to eliminate the phenomenon of piracy in general, but the conflict of European interests, especially France, Russia and Britain, failed this proposal (Abdel Karim, DT, p. 333-336).

After the spread and islands, the English commander "Sydney Smith" proposed sending a intimidation campaign to Algeria, led by Lord "Exmouth" and with the task of liberating the ionic slaves (western Greece) at the beginning of the year 1816AD, and the operation was reconciled, but the threatening tone of the Lord raised the ire of Day Omar, who refused to hand over the prisoners despite the threats of the Lord, then an English fleet sailed with 19 pieces of war, accompanied by a Dutch ferry and reached the Algerian coasts on August 26, 1816AD and bombed the city of Algiers, and the Algerian resistance did not withstand the evidence of the destruction of most pieces of war, and the high number of victims, as the number of deaths reached 600, then Day Omar bowed to negotiations and agreed to the terms of the English (Abbad, p. 220), which stipulated:

- Abolition of enslavement.
- Release all prisoners of different nationalities.
- Providing the majority of the amounts paid by European countries to Algeria since the beginning of the year.
- Pay compensation and an official apology to the Consul of England who was captured by Algeria during the war (Abdul Karim, p. 332).

European efforts did not stop there. The Algerian issue was renewed at the 1818 Excelsior Conference. Opinions differed between sending a joint campaign or mediating at the Porte to prevent Algeria from its maritime activity by its own means. Then it was decided to send two envoys, Thomas Freemantle of England and Admiral Hertian of France, who submitted a threatening letter to the Day, in order to stop maritime activity and pledge the safety of European ships. However, Day Hussein refused to give up his right to inspect foreign ships and confiscate the incomplete documents from them. He also stated that he would treat all ships not contracted with him as aggressors, and thus the mission of the French-English mission failed (Abdul Karim, p. 339 340).

It is clear to us from what has been discussed that the European house has partially overcome its internal problems, which allowed them to look unanimously at Algerian maritime activity as piracy that must be addressed. Were it not for the fear of European nations of each other and their conflicting interests , Algeria would have been dealt a fatal blow since 1815.

From another angle, the failure of these attempts to strike Algeria and stop its activity reinforced the conviction of the Dayat of Algeria that it is invincible and will not be defeated by any force and continued its activity, which made European trade in the Mediterranean basin under constant threat, as it was able to confiscate 79 European ships, and these operations represent the main source of income for the Dayat of Algeria at the time(Courtinat, 2006, s p).

As for the purely French endeavors, they have been since 1808AD, when Napoleon Bonaparte asked Admiral "Decos" to think about the campaign against Algeria, saying: *"Think about a campaign against Algeria, whether in terms of sea or land."* On this basis, the officer sent "Bhutan" from the Corps of Engineers, and asked him to prepare a detailed map, expressing the best location from which to subjugate Algeria, so the officer reached the authority of Sidi Farrag for this task(Bar, Al-Melli, p. 160), based on the following considerations:

- o The area is free of fortifications and cannons, and its terrain is flat, which facilitates the functioning of the French army until it reaches the fortress of the emperor, which oversees the city of Algiers and facilitates it.
- o Suggest that the process of subjugation be in the dry season (May/June) so that the French are safe from waves of diseases and epidemics.
- o The appropriate army estimate for this task is between 35,000and 40,000 soldiers.

- o Working to provoke Algerian wars with its neighbors Tunisia and Far Morocco to cut off their supplies, and provided Bhutan with a detailed map of the port of Algeria and its defensive positions (Amoura, 2006, Part 2, p. 251).

In 1816, the French government appointed Mr. Pierre Duval as its consul in Algeria, and he was able, with his wits and intrigues, to restore the commercial privileges of France and to hunt coral in the Qala region (Bastion). He also tried to legitimize this privilege and the eternal right to it, meaning that if the Algerian government decided to withdraw the privilege, the French had the right to keep the Bastion, and its right to continue to hunt coral in Qala without paying royalties to the Diwan of Algeria (Belil, 2010-2011, p. 242). After the approval of Day Ali Khoja, the French company began a suspicious activity in a short period (1818-1822). The issue of debt, which was exacerbated by the suspicious relationship between the consul and the Jew Bakri¹, was settled at the expense of the Algerian economy, which angered Day Hussein (Abbad, p. 242).

Accordingly, France has been preparing since the end of the 18th century to overthrow Algeria under its colonial grip, and its late implementation is only an opportunity to create the locally and internationally palatable conditions to legitimize this colonial action!

- French preparations and intrigues.

- 1- The Algerian situation

In the period preceding the siege, the country witnessed dire conditions; where separatist rebellions and movements spread, such as the revolution of Muhammad al-Sharif al-Darqawi in the west (1805-1817 AD) and the Tijaniyah revolution in the south (Gomorrhah, p. 244), and the unrest worsened, especially after the defeat at the hands of the English; with the increasing impact of Janissary, which ended with the assassination of Day Omar and the assumption of Day Ali Khoja 1817 AD², and in order to compensate for the losses resulting from the defeat and the decrease in maritime activity, the government imposed more taxes, which reflected negatively on the public life of the population and created popular discontent with the regime (Gomorrhah, p. 244).

¹Bukharis and Bakri are two Jewish merchants living in Algeria who took up a rescue mission for France, which was suffering from famine by buying Algerian wheat with debt, until it reached 2,500,000 gold francs, (Al-Madani, 2009AD, pp. 71,72).

²It is worth mentioning here the talk about Dai Ali Khoja that he caused a revolution against the Janissaries, with liquidation works against them and their collaborators from the ruling Diwan, and the transfer of the headquarters of the Emirate from the Geneina Palace to the Kasbah, and the transfer of the treasury with it, which secured the position of the Dai from their power (Abbad, pp. 221, 222).

When we follow the internal circumstances in detail, we start from Baylik al-Sharq, which witnessed many disturbances, such as the Bey Ahmed al-Mamluki campaign in 1818AD to Taqrut with the aim of eliminating the authority of Bani Jalab, as well as the dispute in Baylik over who holds the position of Sheikh of the Arabs, who is carried by the sons of "Ghanah", the uncles of Haj Ahmad Bay . This generated hatred among the holders of the position before that, and the Hanasha tribe was a source of concern to the Bayak and created unrest and unrest because of the breadth of its relations and powers, and the Namasha tribe, which remained independent and rebellious to power despite the attempts and campaigns of the Bey Shaker 1815AD, and Haj Ahmad Bay 1828AD(Abbad, pp. 227-230).

This constant tension at the regional level contributed to the reduction of agricultural production; by neglecting agriculture or damaging the crop as a result of the conflict, and the wars there often caused the loss of livestock, thus depriving the population of their main source of money or food(Saadallah, 2005, pp. 152-153).

The situation in the rest of the country is similar; Baylik al-Titri was exposed to problems at the hands of the tribes of the sons of Nile, and the sons of Mukhtar, who refused to pay taxes, and continued their anti-regime movements. To the west, the crowns of Yunn flourished and their prosperity became a source of fear among the Ottoman Turks, so they stripped military campaigns against them, the most important of which was in 1820AD, where the Ottoman authority attacked their city and capital, Ain Madi, and it was bombarded with artillery for 36 hours, but it survived and the Tijanians did not submit, but their hatred of the remnants of the Ottoman regime in Algeria increased, which is a common feeling among the rest of Baylik's western population as an inevitable result of Bay Hassan's abuses and repressive actions(Abbad, p. 224-232).

As the situation worsened in this way, those areas of the country remained without real exploitation of their resources and wealth, especially the agricultural ones. The Baylik plains remained without wise exploitation to enable the country to achieve food security, as the region is prone to alliances or tribal conflicts among them or with the Ottoman regime such as tribes of circles and fellowship(Saadallah, 1982, p. 151).

By following the internal situation, Algerian aversion to the remnants of Ottoman rule is evident, especially since in the late era it turned into a tax system, whose task is limited to subjugating the tribes and obtaining taxes, which will weaken the chances of Algerian defense of the Ottoman Turks in the event of attack, even if this includes the submission of their country (Algeria) to a foreign authority, no matter how malevolent. This reflects the extent of Algerian aversion to Ottoman authority.

In general, Algerian economic life at the end of Ottoman rule was not ideal, which adversely affected social reality. The population suffered from famines, diseases and lack of aid, and drought always caused many calamities and crises, exacerbated by the successive wars that the country knew internally, so the standard of living decreased, and the majority of the population became suffering from poverty and the regime's taxes (Saadallah, 1982, pp. 150-153).

As for industry, it has been dominated by traditional ones destined for local use, such as the production of blankets, carpets and ornaments, and it is also unable to compete with European and even Tunisian and Moroccan manufactures (Saadallah, 1982, p. 153).

On the commercial level, it was limited to some weekly markets in each region for the exchange of agricultural crops and some artisanal and textile products. As for the external ones, they were subject to foreign hands, especially the French, and they were crowded by Jewish traders such as Bakri and Bosniak, who were given a monopoly on the export of wheat (Saadallah, 1982, p. 155).

The social and economic reality of the country at this time warns that it is on the verge of collapse, or what is termed colonialism. Internal relations are tense, sovereign sectors are at the mercy of enemy foreigners, and traditional Algerian industry will not be able to withstand European industrial development, especially in the field of armaments and military confrontations.

2- French preparations

The reasons for the tension in Algerian-French relations are as follows:

- 3- France insisted on fortifying and arming the French-African institution and called it the fortress of France, and the Day denied France this right.
- 4- The dispute over the annual royalty paid by the French-African Foundation, and the French saw the coral hunting as a monopoly for them, while the Dey sees it as a source of profit and can sell it to others.
- 5- The movement of Algerian fleets against European ships, which prompts them to take refuge in French ships, which leads to embarrassment.
- 6- The dispute over the debts owed by France, and its conspiracy with the Jews Jacob Cohen Bakri and Mikhail Bushnak in order to lose the right of the Day to claim debts by procrastination (Abdul Karim, pp. 343-344).

The French debts included two types; the government loan represented by Algerian wheat, which was made through the Jews and amounted to 794299254 francs, and the in-kind loan that was

paid in cash to the government of the French Revolution, and amounted to 5 million gold francs (Al-Madani, p. 72).

The Algerian-French relationship emerges through this picture that it has become unequal, as the French actions or to say the French excesses in its dealings nullify any sovereignty of Algeria over its territory, by blatant armament in the French company, and on its economy by trying to acquire its bounties without others, and on its funds by trying to evade its performance, as evidenced by the French ingratitude due to Algeria, which represented a rescue state for France in its plight after the revolution.

The Algerian-French dispute over the issue of debts has intensified since 1825AD, whose roots date back to 1790AD, when the young French Republic signed a 100-year peace agreement between Algeria and Paris, with the provision of grain and lending 250,000 francs in the next few years. This debt officially constitutes credits allocated for the purchase of wheat, mediated by the Jews Bakri and Bosniak, to provide the French armies with supplies, whether in Italy or heading towards Egypt within the framework of the French expeditionary campaign, which exacerbated relations between Algeria and France (Courtinat, s p), especially after Algeria learned of the involvement and complicity of the French Foreign Minister "Talleyrand" with the Jews, knowing that the debt and its benefits amounted to 24 million francs, while the Research Committee, which was suspected by Talleyrand, acknowledged that the debt does not exceed 7 million (Abdelkrim, pp. 344-345). Day Hussein corresponded with the French government, and corresponded directly with the French King to settle the debts owed debt owed on his country, and on the arming of construction in Qalyon, but the shadow of the French government and did not receive these correspondence (Abad, 243).

In the face of the intransigence of the French government and its failure to seek to satisfy the Day, he grew angry and poured his anger on Consul Pierre Duval, who deliberately provoked the Day on the eve of Eid al-Fitr by responding to his question about the failure of the French government to respond to his correspondence. He replied that his government was too high to respond to someone like the Day. Here, Day agitated Hussein and raised his fan in the face of the Consul (Al-Zahar, 1980, p. 164).

The fan incident was an appropriate circumstance that was exploited by the French King Charles X, to distract the attention of the opposition and the French people discontented with his policy, so he announced the naval siege on Algeria on June 15, 1827AD, under the slogan "Protecting French trade and punishing Algeria" (Abbad, p. 243).

Accordingly, the trend of the course of events towards the normalization of relations and the collection of facts emerges. This is for the Algerian side. The decline in the revenues of the seas

on the one hand and the widening of the gap between the Ottoman authority and the Algerian people, as evidenced by the rebellion movement that has emerged in different areas of the country, will make the Ottoman regime in a state of confusion and turmoil in its internal and even foreign policy to impose its authority and maintain its prestige. This thorny situation is parallel to the French measures aimed at bringing relations between them to a point of no retreat, to create the legitimate justification for what will happen next of attacks and abuses.

The facts of the siege

The Fan incident was the bomber of the French colonial project that is more than six centuries old (Knight Balcacem, p. 193), and it is the pretext taken by France to impose its control over Algeria, as evidenced by the departure of the French ships entrusted with the task of siege from their anchors before the Fan incident occurred, during which the French Foreign Minister wrote Consul Pierre Duval ordering him to refrain from contacting Day Hussein and his government, and leave this to the ship commander, as they were about to arrive, and in turn he will ask for urgent satisfaction for the dignity of France (Abdel Karim, p. 347).

Attempts to calm down

Despite the French preparations for the occupation of Algeria, the internal French situation was unstable, as a result of the popular revolts against the existing rule and the different classes of people and political parties, as well as the turmoil caused by the Napoleonic wars, and thus the presidency of the government led by Martinek sought to conclude peace with the Dey through the mediation of the Consuls of Britain and Sardinia (Abbad, p. 245).

The terms of satisfaction included the following:

- That Day Hussein moves to the consulate house and makes an official apology, or that he receives the consul at his court in an official ceremony.
- Or sending a delegation headed by the Prime Minister and apologizing to French ships.

In all cases, the French flag must be raised on all fortresses in the city of Algiers and greeted by the Algerian guns with a hundred bullets, only then the apology will be accepted, and in the event that the day rejects these conditions of satisfaction within 24 hours, French ships will proceed to close and besiege all Algerian ports (Abdelkrim, p. 347).

Al-Day Hussein refused those conditions, and the 12 French ships besieged them under the command of Admiral Colette, (a naval military division consisting of one ship, three frigates and three light ships Taillemite, (s e), p56).

The aim is to cut off the supply from Algeria and stop its maritime activity (piracy)(Saadallah, 1982, p. 27). The commander of the blockade asked the Algerian Minister of the Navy to present himself to apologize first for the propeller incident, and secondly, pledging to completely refrain from any piracy activity in the Mediterranean, and to stop demanding royalties, while returning the papal ships, as well as recognizing France's right of priority care in Algeria. The response of the day was categorical rejection and sarcasm, saying: "It is only left for these to ask my wife..."(Al-Jilani, 1980AD, vol. 3, p. 393).

Four months after the start of the naval siege, and in the absence of most of the pieces of the Algerian fleet, which were stationed with the Ottoman fleets to put down the revolutions in the Balkans, the Algerian navy tried to break the siege. On October 4, 1827, Reyes managed to seize two French pieces, while many attempts failed, and the chances of getting rid of the siege decreased after the crash of most of the units of the Algerian fleet in the naval battle of Navarin on October 20, 1827 in front of the fleet of the Tripartite League of England, France, and Russia (Abbad, pp. 243-244).

This constituted a qualitative push for the French government towards resolving the dispute over the occupation of Algeria project, between the group that proposed to continue the siege, and the group that was inclined to direct military invasion and then total occupation, which is the opinion of the King and his Minister of War, Clermont-Tonnier. The results of the vote on October 16, 1827AD came to settle for a temporary siege, and when the fleet crashed, the French preached to the priest Boswa a saying: " You will fall under the feet of your predecessor, you say, O Algeria, rich in your spoils of Christianity, and your ships frightened you with self-confidence, but you will attack in your own backyard" (Night in Qasim, p. 225).

Concurrently, diplomatic attempts to obtain appeasement continue, so the French government sent the delegate Messi de Labre in July 1829AD, who contacted the Dai and presented his government's proposals to apologize for the sin committed by him to Consul Pierre Duval, and to pretend remorse and retract his hostile attitude towards France, however, the Dai Hussein refused (Al-Jilani, pp. 372-373). The same position of Dai with the mission of the French delegate to Bartronier at the end of July 1829(Khoja, 1982, p. 183).

These efforts were confirmed over time by the success of the siege and the inability of the Algerian Navy to dismantle it until 1829AD, with a desperate attempt in which it managed to seize three small ships belonging to the French army on June 17, 1829AD, in addition to the refuge of two French guard ships to the Algerian coast (Al-Zahar, p. 182). Those who were captured by the residents of the city of Algeria, were killed and their heads were sold to the di, which will increase French anger and push them towards revenge(Wolf, 2009, p. 450).

At that point, the Ottoman efforts began semi-officially to end the crisis. The Sublime Porte sent Khalil Effendi, the agent of the Dey to the Sublime Porte, and demanded intervention and the exploitation of his influence with the Dey Hussein to reach a formula for rapprochement between him and the French government. However, these efforts faded as soon as it was informed of the conditions of the Dey based on the refusal to return the fortress of France. He rejected the monopoly of trade in Annaba to France, and the possibility of restoring the monopoly of coral fishing in the event that France made the largest offer, turning the page of this crisis and allowing the renewal of relations and treaties between the two parties, which the French government considered humiliating and rejected (Abdel Karim, p. 561), and another mission carried out by Taher Pasha, the envoy of the Porte, who is considered a veteran of the Ottoman fleet, and assigned him the task of warning Day Hussein of the consequences of the French aggression, as he left the Ottoman territories in May 1830AD, but this mission was not allowed to enter Algerian waters and was forced by the French siege ships to dock in Tunisia (Courtinat, s p).

From another angle, the regional and international climate was fraught with contradictions. On the Egyptian arena, the personality of Muhammad Ali Pasha and his expansionist ambitions emerged, and this was accompanied by an Ottoman fear of those ambitions, in parallel with facing the urgent Russian attempts to reach the warm waters, as well as France's desire to rebel against the decisions of the Vienna Conference and expand in the continent of Europe, and thus the French government sought to direct these contradictions in its favor; by sharing Europe with Russia, and harnessing those who discipline Day Hussein, and this is not at the expense of its treasury and economy, by beating Algeria with the Egyptians, and winning the favor of the Ottoman Empire by distracting Muhammad Ali Pasha towards the West, and all this is in favor of France, which will retain its power to draw a map of Europe as it suits it (Abdul Karim, pp. 362-382). Polignac tasked the French consulator in Alexandria, "Droveti" with the task of convincing Muhammad Ali Pasha, in exchange for granting him a large financial loan, and four ships of the French font (Taille, 57).

The aforementioned French endeavors met with strong opposition from the Ottoman Empire and Britain, and Muhammad Ali Pasha feared for his status and reputation in the Islamic world, and that he would expose himself to humiliation because of his alliance with a Christian country, against a Muslim sister country, and therefore refused to participate in the subjugation of Algeria and Morocco, in addition to Russia's opposition. I sent a message to the French government saying: "How can you not sabotage the nest of piracy yourself" (Abbad, p. 245).

The reasons for the French hesitation are due to the fear of failing again to overthrow the Algerian regime, especially with the apparent steadfastness of Algeria in the face of the siege.

Some of the military presented the idea of naval bombardment of the city of Algiers because they were afraid of the ground operation due to their ignorance of the Algerian nature in a diligent and accurate manner. The reports of the spy Bhutan were focused on the coasts. Therefore, embarking on a ground war represents an adventure with incalculable consequences. However, opinions about the idea of naval bombardment have retreated, due to the failure of all previous European attempts, the last of which was the Lord Exmouth campaign in 1816, despite its equipment. Algeria strengthened its defensive fortifications after that campaign, and established a group of bakeries carrying artillery shells, and thus the chances of success in naval bombardment are almost non-existent, so a double land and sea operation was preferred (Taillemite, p. 57).

Outcomes of the blockade

In economic terms, the siege led to the cessation of trade exchange between Algeria and Europe and caused the diversion of trade routes east of Algeria towards Tunisia. Only the western marinas, especially Oran, Arzio and Rashkoun, remained in contact with Spain (Al-Jilani, p. 371). For France, the siege cost significant losses to the French economy from the human and material side. The losses were estimated at seven million francs, and it also disrupted French trade in the Mediterranean. The military expenditures of the siege exceeded twenty million francs (Night Balqasim, p. 193), and increased the anger of politicians rejecting it. Parliamentary MP Dobork said in the session held on June 9, 1829AD: " ...This siege cost France in two years losses estimated at more than two million francs, while the French fleet did not seize any ship worth more than twenty thousand francs" (Al-Jilani, p. 371).

In light of these circumstances and in light of the failure of the policy of calm and negotiations between the two parties, because each party adhered to its conditions and did not concede, the issue of the siege was presented to the French Council of Ministers during its meeting held on January 31, 1830AD. The majority vote was in favor of sending a military campaign towards Algeria (Wolf, p. 450), and this vote is not considered an effective decision except after the approval of the King, and this was on February 7, 1830AD, where he issued a royal decree in which he set the practical steps of the invasion process by appointing the commander of the campaign, Count D Bermoun, with wide powers with the aim of drawing up the campaign plan and its details, and thus the orders were directed at the Navy and the ground forces for rapid preparation, and an amount of 80million francs was allocated to cover the expenses of the campaign, while the approved plan for the invasion was based on the report of Spy Bhutan (Hamdani, 2007, p. 163), which was accurately implemented and whose details contributed to the success of the campaign from its starting point until the arrival and landing of the invading French forces without hinds (Taillemite, p. 59).

conclusion

After studying the subject of the French naval blockade of Algeria, we reached the following conclusions:

- The idea of overthrowing Algeria and eliminating it is not the result of 1827AD, or a purely French subject, but it is a European idea as old as the greatness of Algeria and its fleet. However, the conditions for implementing this process were not created in light of the dispersion of European opinion and its lack of agreement on a unified mechanism aimed at settling the eastern issue in general, and getting rid of Algerian maritime activity in particular.
- The Algerian retreat since the beginning of the 19th century at various political, administrative, social and economic levels will constitute the basic support and solid ground for the success of any subjugation. These deteriorating conditions will not allow it to withstand any invasion, whatever its party, especially with the great superiority that Europe is experiencing as a result of the Age of Enlightenment first and the industrial overthrow second, and therefore Algeria was in a miserable historical stage or what is termed colonialism.
- The fan incident highlights the ingenuity of the French consul in adjusting his performance and choosing the right moment, so that the incident, on the face of it, condemns Day Hussein for violating diplomatic traditions and not improving the hospitality of his visitor, while the most senior convict was the consul by daring his host, and his complicity with the heap of his country in provoking Day.
- Despite the French readiness for the siege in number and number, Algeria's prestige is still present, which made them flounder about the mechanism of ending the siege between indirect military solutions, through the Egyptian regime, and between simply apologizing, due to the French government's fear that this attempt would be a new number in the failed attempts to strike and overthrow the Algerian regime since the 17th century.
- The three years of siege allowed the French state to complete its military, political and international readiness to subdue Algeria, clarify its vision towards this country and determine its fate. On the other hand, it contributed to the consolidation of the Algerian retreat and the execution of the chances of survival in the event that the siege was ended by a military strike, which was done.
- The French naval blockade of Algeria represents an important link in the series of French hatred of Algeria and the relentless pursuit of its overthrow under the colonial grip. Despite the great role played by Algeria in supporting the French government after its revolution and the European blockade imposed on it, the latter was plotting and preparing to attack Algeria and control it.

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