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The Influence of Friedrich Nietzsche's Critique of Metaphysics on Western and Arab Philosophers

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Abstract

This study examines the profound and transformative impact of Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of traditional metaphysics on contemporary philosophical thought in both Western and Arab contexts. First, it highlights the epistemological and genealogical foundations of Nietzschean critique, particularly his deconstruction of the "apparent/true world" dichotomy and his characterization of metaphysics as a system of petrified metaphors, as well as its intrinsic link to the will to power and nihilism. The study traces the influence of this Nietzschean deconstruction within contemporary Western philosophy, beginning with Martin Heidegger's retrieval of Being through his critique of the "oblivion of Being," and extending to the postmodern and deconstructive currents of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze. These thinkers adopted the genealogical method and critical discourse analysis as tools to dismantle Western logocentrism. In the Arab context, the study explores how contemporary Arab thought has engaged with this critique; Nietzschean tools have been employed to re-examine tradition and dismantle closed metaphysical and ideological structures by thinkers such as Mohammed Arkoun, Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, Ali Harb, and Fathi Meskini. The study concludes that Nietzsche's critique was not merely a rupture with Western metaphysics but served as an epistemological horizon that enabled both Western and Arab thought to rethink the crises of meaning, the self, and freedom within a post-metaphysical landscape.

Keywords: Critique of Metaphysics, Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy, Contemporary Western Philosophy, Postmodernism, Contemporary Arab Thought, Deconstruction of Tradition, Will to Power.

Introduction

Since its Platonic inception and through its systematic formulations in modern rationalism, Western metaphysics has constituted the grand endeavor to ground "truth" upon transcendent principles and immutable essences. However, the nineteenth century witnessed a cognitive earthquake in the form of Friedrich Nietzsche's radical critique of this system. Nietzsche did not merely revisit its categories; he employed a "philosophy with a hammer" to deconstruct its epistemological and moral foundations, thereby exposing the linguistic illusions and the latent "will to power" concealed behind its facade.

This genealogical destruction transcended its own historical moment, becoming the primary bridge toward a "post-metaphysical philosophy." Contemporary Western philosophy—from Heidegger's ontology to Derrida's deconstruction and Foucault's genealogy—has drawn upon the Nietzschean method to dismantle logocentrism and the authority of texts. This influence was not confined to the West; it extended to contemporary Arab thought, which discovered in Nietzschean tools a critical apparatus for re-examining tradition and dismantling closed ideological and metaphysical structures, with the aim of reconstructing the questions of the self, modernity, and freedom.

Consequently, the central problematic of this article is: How did Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics contribute to the reconfiguration of the contemporary philosophical horizon, and what is the nature and scope of the epistemological transformations this critique induced within both Western philosophical discourse and contemporary Arab thought?

First- Nihilism in Nietzsche's Philosophy:

Nietzsche is often considered the modern father of nihilism, and the foundations of the nihilistic doctrine state that there are no eternal truths, there is no eternal goal, and there is no absolute meaning or significance to human existence. Ultimately, what we encounter in life is what Nietzsche called triviality, that is, the triviality of meaninglessness. There is no God, and since there is no God, there is no absolute meaning to human life; this is what is meant by nihilism, or the triviality of the human ordeal. His intellectual theories were formed during his university study days: "Nihilism confirms the spread of a pathological phenomenon, which is decadence. As long as decadence remains confined to certain social classes and certain regions of the globe, it does not pose a danger to human civilization; but it becomes a terrible disaster when it sweeps—as is the case today in Nietzsche's view—all classes, institutions, and peoples, until it ultimately merges with the very idea

of humanity itself." Thus, the term nihilism is a word found in Jacobi, Jean Paul, Turgenev, and the Russian anarchist philosophers, which Nietzsche borrowed from Paul Bourget. It is used to indicate, for Nietzsche, the essence of the fatal crisis that struck the modern world: "the fall of universal values that plunged humanity into the gloom of absurdity by imposing upon it a pessimistic certainty with which nothing has value." Nietzsche studied history, just as he studied the culture of the nineteenth century, and began complaining about the main characteristics of nineteenth-century European culture, which he described as decadent.

Decadence means undergoing a process of radical dissolution or corruption. Nietzsche saw that this decadence resulted from the negative influence of the Christian Church, because the Christian Church established certain values that Nietzsche was convinced would undermine and destroy the human spirit. For example: Christian ethics rely on grace, mercy, and pity; according to Nietzsche, these alleged virtues instill a weakness within people and make them live in an inattentive and uncreative way. This way somewhat hinders the basic growth of the human spirit and eliminates what existentialists call "authentic human existence." Nietzsche observed that the necessary antidote for the survival of Western civilization and for culture to reach its maximum potential—which should not have happened in the first place—was that we had to get rid of this emotional religion that blinded people to the reality of human existence as we see it. "The death of gods records the collapse of the doctrine upon which decadence built its kingdom. Nihilism means that the gods have died; this means that the set of ideals and values that guaranteed the dominance of decadence betrays the void (nothingness) that was its hidden foundation, i.e., the dominance of the denial spirit over philosophy and in Western civilization, and the supremacy of the principle of depreciating life and existence, where negativity becomes the essential manifestation of existence, and negation and denial become the essential manifestation of the will, so the reactive model becomes the dominant model over civilization and man"(1).

Nihilism, according to this vision, means "a will of negation and execution of life, and it is not the will that denies itself in the higher values, but rather the higher values that are linked to the will of negation"(2). Since nihilism is a new space for thinking, it works to problematize the meaning of existence and radically poses the problem of meaning and value. By virtue of that, it requires performing a radical transformation, just as it inverted the question of value regarding values and inverted the question of philosophy regarding the philosophy of philosophy. As for Deleuze, he classifies nihilism in Nietzsche into three forms: the first is negative nihilism, about which Nietzsche says: "placing the center of life not in life, but in the furthest beyond in the afterlife, in nothingness, by depriving life of its importance and weight"(3), and it is a will of negation and killing of life; consequently, life takes the value of nothingness. As for the second meaning, it no longer means a

"will", but rather a reaction against the transcendent world, and this means the depreciation of sacred values and higher ideals, which is a negation of their existence and a complete denial of their validity; this is no longer a lowering of the value of life, but has become a lowering of the value of the higher values themselves(4), and this is called reactivity. As for the third meaning, "it is based on depreciating both life and existence together, whether transcendent or immanent"(5).

"Nihilism begins with pessimism as a mixture of disgust, neurosis, and nostalgia, where romantic melancholy darkens. It acquires its distinctive rational justification in Schopenhauer's philosophy; this philosophy derives its argument from pain to announce, in a theory, the transcendence of nothingness over existence, and thus ends practically with the destruction of the will to live, through an asceticism based on Buddhist teaching. Thereby, it exposes its partnership with the most harmful tendencies of decadence. Nietzsche asks and answers, saying: The simplest reality of the question of whether non-existence is not more correct than existence is itself a disease of a decadent relationship"(6). "According to Heidegger, nihilism begins with the moment of establishing higher values, then the moment of their depreciation and absurdity, passing through the moment of existence devoid of meaning and lacking value, and ending with the call to establish new values to replace the worn-out values"(7). All forms of nihilism that we have passed through so far share a common feature of surrender or retreat before the apparent enemy with the death of God. But hope appears with the last stage, so nihilism transcends itself, and finally the affirming will to power enters the game—that power that prefers life over nothingness, and decides to create values instead of suffering severely from the death of God. From this perspective, nihilism appears as a counter-party to the development of the new and precise humanity; we must know that such an affirming will needs support and a teaching based on a very rigorous experience(8).

Gadamer noted in his book *The Beginning of Philosophy*, expressing his opinion on everything written about what is in philosophy, saying: Our attitude toward the past has been saturated with Nietzsche, and he has also left his mark on our current philosophical works; indeed, many prominent thinkers such as Hegel and Schleiermacher opened the doors of philosophical research into Greek philosophy, especially pre-Socratic philosophy, yet it was Nietzsche's research that fascinated the philosophers of our time and awakened in them nostalgia for that Greek adventure. So what did Nietzsche say about the Greeks to drive the philosophers of this time, starting from Heidegger and reaching Gadamer, to place the question of the Greek origins of Europe at the heart of their research and interests? "This is our obsession later: establishing philosophy on the concepts of alterity, communication, and difference that recognizes every self, practices no exceptions, no communication, and no exclusions; it is a discourse of forgiveness and tolerance in the name of difference; it is the democracy of philosophy"(9)

Second: The Impact of Nietzschean Critique on Western Philosophers:

1- Nietzsche and Heidegger:

Nietzsche prophesied a news in light of his thinking as if the philosophers of the future were an extension of him, so they came as he wanted them, influenced in one way or another by his philosophy, and they were, as he expected, a radical shift in Western philosophical thought, moving from centrality to its absence, from absolute truth to the multiplicity of truths, or in other words, non-truth. Nietzsche was the principal thinker in this change and development in contemporary philosophical thought, ever-present in the contemporary philosophical system. Thus, philosophies resentful of metaphysics and the centrality of thinking came as an extension of him. In this research, we will address the presence of Nietzsche's critical philosophy in contemporary philosophy, particularly in the thought of Heidegger, Derrida, and Foucault, and naturally in a concise manner to demonstrate that postmodern philosophy came influenced by Nietzsche's critical thought and was not a break with or a departure from it in many of its theses and ideas.

The presence of Nietzsche's philosophy in Heidegger's works manifests above all in the critique that both thinkers direct at Western metaphysics. "Heidegger faulting metaphysical philosophy for philosophy's preoccupation with the entity at the expense of particular Being; philosophy, as Heidegger says, searches for the entity as such, meaning that philosophy is on its way in searching for the entity within Being, and in other words, it searches for the entity with regard to its Being. Aristotle explained this when he added to his previous question: What is the entity? An explanation translated as: What is the entity means what is the entity-ness of the entity; Being, the entity, has a relation to its entity-ness. As for Plato, he expressed Being by saying it is the Idea, whereas Aristotle considered it energy and a moving force"(10). "Heidegger begins his approach to retrieve interpretation, which primarily aims to interpret the meaning of Nietzsche's text and the value of that text as well, through a full understanding of the motives and traditions that produced it. Heidegger sees Nietzsche as the last desperate spokesman for Western metaphysics, which collapsed onto its ethical and logical givens and began trying in vain to overcome problems that were of its own making. In Heidegger's view, Nietzsche is a central figure in thought representing reason in facing its limits and its initial return to Being, or if you will, the point of origin that preceded the troubling ethical and logical deceptions"(11).

As for our own view that goes toward affirming Heidegger's metaphysics and thought, it can be demonstrated through the characteristic that sees the metaphysical spirit permeating the entire Heideggerian intellectual fabric. His famous lecture *What Is Metaphysics?* is, in the reality of its presentation—and as Heidegger intended this presentation to be understood—an attempt to

condemn philosophers' failure to understand this concept. As for the nature of condemning metaphysics—according to philosophers' understanding of it—it is due to its preoccupation with the entity alone and its neglect of Being, which is its only true subject of inquiry in the measure of the relationship to non-being (nothingness), condemning it for its shift toward the entity and for its separation and cessation from inquiring into the relationship between Being and non-being"(12). "The goal of this turn (Kehre) is to enter the role correctly to push the challenge laid upon the analysis of Dasein to its extreme limit, that is, interpreting Being phenomenologically and bringing it out of the domain of metaphysics as the history of the oblivion of Being. The turn or bend does not exist only in the interlocking loop between Being and time, but also affects the question of truth and essence, as Heidegger expressed in his saying: that the question of the essence of truth is itself and at the same time the question of the truth of essence. The issue of essence is posed as a fundamental issue that turns upon itself against itself, and this turn that we face here is an indicator of what we will reach through contact with genuine philosophical questioning"(13).

Therefore, he faulted metaphysics for its concern with the supreme entity at the expense of particular Being; in his response to classical metaphysics, he says: "It seems that metaphysics, due to the growth by which we think of the entity, and which it did not grasp, is the barrier that prevents man from the relationship of Being to his essence in his primary relationship"(14). "The phenomenological destruction of traditional ontology aims, therefore, to re-withdraw the question of Being in its relations to time into the domain of phenomenological questioning; that is, describing the phenomenon of Being anew in its relation to the existence of the phenomenon—the entity—that is, questioning the existence of the entity outside the metaphysics of presence through which the entire history of Western thought was thought. It is likewise a dispersion and deconstruction of the major concepts that formed the philosophical discourse of the West, revealing the hidden foundations of Western modernity since Descartes, and returning to its Greek origins. Dissolving the fundamental notions of Western metaphysics requires re-withdrawing them into the domain of contemporary consciousness and living them as a present reality to expose the finitude that touches them and make them betray their inability to confront the phenomenological question. Hence Husserl said in his book *The Crisis of European Sciences*: making tradition an absolute present reality requires re-withdrawing it into the domain of consciousness and living it as an event"(15).

The recorded observation is that "metaphysics, as the history of the truth of the entity, arose out of the destiny of Being itself; thus it is the secret of Being, but a secret that was not thought through because it remained an ambiguous secret"(16). "Metaphysics is considered, then, a specific perspective and world view that involves from the outset the postulates of the system in which the West thought: the entity, science, God, man, history... as presence, forgetting the ontological

difference between Being and the entity. From this perspective and vision, it determined the historical results of Western culture over the following centuries, including modern times, and the project of technology latent in the metaphysical essence of modernity. Modernity and technology are the extreme results produced by a metaphysical thought or the distant echo of such thought: metaphysics under all its forms, and in all stages of its history, is a single destiny and perhaps the necessary destiny for the West, and the condition for its dominance over the entire earth. There is, therefore, a close relationship between the mode of thinking called metaphysics, which is the specificity of Western thought, and the will to dominance that now imposes its sway through technology over all parts of the globe entirely; for technology in its essence is a historical ontological destiny for the truth of Being in as much as it is latent in oblivion, as Heidegger says willingly"(17).

"What is important for Heidegger is following a method that suits the subject of ontology, which is grasping the meaning of Being in general. Hence, it was imperative for phenomenological analysis to address particular being from the perspective of absolute Being, and this particular existential given consists of the existence of the entity. However, this existence—contrary to what might come to our minds—is hidden, meaning that it does not manifest to us at first glance"(18). This view conflicts with Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics based on its rejection because it is the opposite of reality or Being; for if Nietzsche had acknowledged this critique and stated it, his critique would have become valueless. Heidegger's view expresses an idealistic stance complementary to the Kantian critique, which holds that the thing-in-itself exists in reality and is not transcendent to it. "We can observe here that something of Kantianism sneaks stealthily into the first steps of Heideggerian ontology, because these attempts presuppose an existence beyond the immediate given, and presuppose it at the same time arbitrarily"(19). "Heidegger concluded after the 1927 corpus a decisive result stating that phenomenology can only move within the horizon of metaphysics; phenomenology and its language disappeared from Heidegger's subsequent writings under the weight of the sense of failure that afflicted the language of Being and Time. The concept of Dasein itself seemed—until then—nothing but the latest version of the forms of transcendental subjectivity, and that the concepts of Being and Time are the last Cartesian generations. Dasein seems to be a hermeneutic result of a process of destroying the modern Ego rather than an invention out of nothing"(20).

2- Nietzsche and Derrida:

The impact of Nietzsche's critical philosophy was not limited to Heidegger and existentialism, but extended beyond them to deconstruction. He was prophetic when he considered that the next hundred years would inaugurate a new phase of thinking that would witness the death of ideologies, to be replaced by multiplicity and difference. "Jacques Derrida makes the deconstruction of

metaphysical systems constructed by pure reason a goal for his deconstructive project, Lyotard makes the principle of desire a basis for opposing the idea of reason, and Rorty tries, through what he called edifying philosophy, to remove the distinction between truth and metaphor to make philosophy a simple literary genre that can be subsumed under the history of the arts. From the same starting point as well, Baudrillard sees that the attempt to discover fixed truths underlying things is an illusion that must be disposed of; postmodernism is originally opposed to the idea of meaning underlying things, and the result is the loss of the concept of reason and the absence of truth in a reality crossed by numerous powers seeking to control and possess it"(21).

"Through the approach he called deconstruction, Derrida began a fundamental inquiry into the nature of the Western metaphysical tradition and its constitution in the law of self-identity; with a superficial look, the results of this inquiry appear as though they reveal an enigmatic tradition due to its paradoxes and logical difficulties"(22). "Derrida sees that the entire history of philosophy, despite all differences, not only since the days of Plato up to the rationality of Hegel, but even since the pre-Socratic philosophers until the last major contemporary philosopher, the German Heidegger, attributed all truth to reason or Logos. Reason was the primary center, and this centrality formed a kind of imperialism that began to dominate humanity with an ethnocentric, racist centrality that constituted the centrality of the West"(23). "The concept of plurality and difference occupies a prominent position in postmodern philosophical discourse, to the extent that its philosophers were described as philosophers of difference. The concept of substance will vanish from postmodern discourse to be replaced by the concept of plurality... plurality in all its forms: plurality of discourse, meaning, phenomenon, and forces. The thought of difference faulted classical philosophy for excluding the Other and possessing it ontologically, epistemologically, and politically"(24).

Now, if we compare between Derrida and Nietzsche, "we see that Nietzsche's reading of the philosophical text was from the outside, meaning it dealt with topics in the philosophy of Kant, Plato, or Hegel in their general form, unlike Derrida, who reads the text linguistically and performs the deconstruction process through shattering the foundations upon which the philosophical text rests. This is what Derrida focused on in his critique of Heidegger in his reading of the Nietzschean text, where Derrida sees that Heidegger is limited by interpreting the issue of the truth of Being, which contributes through the same myth of symbolic concentration to the formulation of origins, whereas Derrida works and strives to expose it"(25). In general, both philosophers, Heidegger and Derrida, pursue the same deconstructive goals, but the disagreement lies in the fact that Heidegger searches for the foundations and rules of authentic thought embodied in the moment of Being or perfection. As for Derrida, that can represent another classical case of common metaphysical longing to search for truth and origins; Heidegger's deconstruction remained within metaphysics, whereas Derrida's

work rests on deconstructing centralities and shattering them, as he questions a set of truths and concepts that have acquired sanctity over ancient history.

As for Nietzsche, he remained within the framework of previous metaphysics, such as the centrality of becoming, the will to power, the higher man (Overman), and earthly existence in general. "Derrida undertook the journey of deconstructing Western metaphysics based on what he learned from Western philosophical and anthropological methods and strategies. He established grammatology (the science of writing) in opposition to the oral consecration of culture; he stands against the metaphysics of speech and its presence in favor of writing, as his conception generally rests on the concept of difference (différance), from which he hopes to undo the privileges of Western centrality and its spider-like cohesions so that the message of philosophy may be reborn, not to be a means for political, ideological, and philosophical commitment, but to free itself from the authoritativeness of discourse and its presence for writing and difference"(26). In sum, we can say "that Derrida's concept of deconstruction is one of the central operational concepts upon which he established the joints of his philosophical discourse. It was among the primary tenets of this concept to deconstruct Western centrality and give importance and value to the margins and peripheries, because he saw that Western thought is built on a hostile opposition and does not exist except through this binary, such as the binary of mind and body, self and other, orality and writing, man and woman, and so forth, and that this thought always grants privilege and superiority to the first side and casts inferiority on the second side; this is Derrida's bias against logocentrism"(27). We can say that Derrida deconstructed Western centrality and made it a method followed and pursued by his followers.

3- Nietzsche and Foucault:

Undoubtedly, Foucault's relationship with Nietzsche has become well known; Foucault addressed Nietzsche's hermeneutic reading of philosophy and examined Nietzsche's genealogy and its relationship to history. There are many ideas in Foucault's philosophy that correspond with similar ideas in Nietzsche's philosophy, such as genealogy in Nietzsche and archaeology in Foucault, or the death of God in Nietzsche's philosophy and the death of the author in Foucault: "In fact, what we can draw from Foucault's thesis is that truth, or what appears to be truth, is at its core a power game practiced on a specific group in order to serve the forces controlling the conflict. Foucault says: Truth is linked to systems of power that generate and support it"(28).

Foucault's declaration of the death of man is a critique of egocentrism, of the Cartesian Cogito that accompanied Western thought for two centuries; it is a critique of centrality in all its forms, specifically the thesis of the death of the author, which rendered man absent and eliminated him as

a defining authority, followed by the development occurring in science, which finally announced his real death. "Thus, saying the death of man, or if you will, the disappearance of the subject, is not merely an expression of a new epistemology that insists on the unity of scientific discourse and is concerned with excluding the concept of man, which has long raised confusion within the scope of language; rather, it is in truth, or rather, an ideological expression of contemporary man's inclination toward abandoning activity or action, within the framework of that technocratic society that has come to plan everything for him"(29).

"Foucault wanted to stand at the roots of Western rationality and direct our attention, along this path he pursued, to elucidate a subtle difference between reason and madness, through which he pondered the historicity and relativity of this rationality, revealing that the history of madness is most likely the history of the Other, which is for a given culture both internal and alien together, and therefore ought to be excluded"(30). Finally, we can say that the structuralist and deconstructivist schools were built upon Nietzsche's theses and merely worked to develop them; thus, his dominance over Western thought in the twentieth century could be said to be an absolute dominance.

Third: The Impact of His Critique of Metaphysics on Arab Philosophers:

Undoubtedly, the presence of Nietzschean thought in Arab philosophy was a strong presence, characterized at times by disconnection and at other times by connection. What concerns us here is the nectar that Arab philosophy absorbed from Nietzschean philosophy; thus, revolution, rebellion, shaking prevalent ideas, and the inversion of values found a wide echo among Arab thinkers, and we will suffice by mentioning some thinkers as living models of the extension of Nietzschean thought. "Nietzsche was the first to radically invert the relationship of the will to knowledge, and the first to stress the will as the symbol of power; it is the primary phenomenon, whereas knowledge is the secondary phenomenon, and the latter comes subsequently to be subject to the former and a servant to it. Knowledge is the official spokesman for the will and its mouthpiece, and the work it performs is not for its own account, but rather for the account of the will. This relationship between will and knowledge resembles the example given by Schopenhauer, describing the will as the strong blind man carrying on his shoulders a paralyzed man who sees clearly"(31).

1- Nietzsche and Abdel Rahman Badawi:

We can say that Badawi was influenced by Nietzsche, and we can notice a strong presence of Nietzsche in his works. One of the most important Arab thinkers is Abdel Rahman Badawi, who sought, through introducing Nietzsche to Arabic, to present us with the summary of Western thought, when he found in him the best and most honest expression among philosophers, the

closest to the spirit of the age, and the most concerned with the real problems of humanity through his eagerness for his thought to be living and capable of growth and production. "The first of Badawi's books in which he declares his stance and the closest to his heart is his book *Nietzsche*, who is considered by most historians of philosophy as the pioneer of existentialism with a rebellious, rejecting humanistic orientation. Badawi presents him to us in his book as a form of European thought within the framework of his project that aims to present the summary of European thought to show the youth of his generation the way of the European mind as it seeks to establish a new humanistic outlook on life and civilization"(32).

In truth, Badawi does not ask us to follow Nietzsche blindly without disagreeing with him, for this does not concern him; rather, what really concerns him is adopting from Nietzsche his way of thinking, presenting problems, and offering solutions to them, to serve as a preparation for establishing a revolution that encompasses all the people of this homeland. Likewise, Nietzsche's thought served as the impact and theoretical foundation for Badawi's direction toward politics through his affiliation with the Misr Al-Fatah party, where he worked as the head of foreign relations. Furthermore, Nietzsche's liberating revolution and his rejection of worn-out customs and traditions represented a kind of affinity between Badawi and the German thinker. Badawi himself admits his deep influence by Nietzsche, as he says about himself: an Egyptian philosopher and historian of philosophy whose philosophy is existential philosophy... he encompassed all the history of philosophy and delved deeply into the doctrines of various philosophers, especially the Germans, but the strongest development in his philosophical thought is due to Nietzsche, which made Badawi, in the eyes of many Arab elites, an embodiment of Nietzsche's views.

"Interest in Nietzsche is not because he is a pioneer of existentialism, but because he is an image of European thought that he presents to the children of his generation, just as he presents us with other images such as Plato, Aristotle, and Spengler; he presents them to us as a means and an instrument for rethinking our reality and our lives. What he aims for, what really concerns us, is to impel them to think about what the European mind thought about, in order to take from this view and that contemplation and thinking a motive, material, and a tool for creating this new outlook in whose name they will declare their desired spiritual revolution"(33). Regarding this presentation, we can cite what Mahmoud Amin Al-Alem said: "Badawi represented one day a call for salvation for a group of intellectuals during World War II, and I was one of those walking in his path; we used to devour his words as if they were sacred bread, and I remember going to the university carrying the mythical model heralded by Nietzsche, the Overman (higher man), and Badawi was the first embodiment of this Western model; he is an embodiment of the will to power and master morality..."(34). And here is the thinker Hassan Hanafi nicknaming him the comprehensive

philosopher, describing his works as "the largest expanse known to contemporary Arab thought in human thought, and there is no philosopher who served philosophical thought in Egypt as much as the comprehensive philosopher served it"(35). It is clear, then, that "Badawi sees that the safe path for the conditions of a renaissance resumption is borrowing from European thought as it is a revolution of spiritual power and a source for another Arab civilization"(36).

2- Nietzsche and Edward Said:

The major transformations experienced by philosophy and the methodological revolutions in the human sciences, particularly in history and anthropology, have altered the mechanism of reading and the method of understanding in our view of Orientalism. Ever since Claude Lévi-Strauss declared that culture is what creates race, rather than race creating culture, the problem of Orientalism shifted from its place and left philosophical research; that is, it came to be treated as an epistemological problem involved within the philosophy of the self and the metaphysics of logocentrism, which has become an epistemological charge in contemporary philosophical study (37).

"Said's project set out to fathom the relationship between knowledge and power in Orientalism, drawing from these views that characterized Foucault's work; indeed, he pursued Foucault's formidable philosophy to its utmost logical limit and used his tools of excavation and archaeology in what can be considered the first attempt to write an archaeology of Orientalism. Furthermore, Said's theory does not descend solely from Foucault's cultural pessimism, but also from other distant origins dating back to the nineteenth century; indeed, Said is one of Nietzsche's lineage, and it is easy to link Said's views on knowledge and power with Nietzsche's views on knowledge and the will. Nietzsche was the first to radically invert the relationship of the will to knowledge, and the first to stress the will as the symbol of power; it is the primary phenomenon, whereas knowledge is the secondary phenomenon, and the latter comes subsequently to be subject to the former and a servant to it"(38).

What Said wants to arrive at is that "behind the system of Orientalist discourse hides another implicit discourse represented in the discourse of European imperialist ideology. It is not surprising that Orientalist studies witnessed the peak of their activity at the height of colonial expansion, in addition to having received support from colonial institutions. He says: Orientalism expresses this side and represents it culturally and even intellectually, considering Orientalism a style of discourse—that is, of thinking and speaking—supported by institutions, vocabulary, scientific research, imagery, intellectual doctrines, and even colonial bureaucracies and colonial methods"(39).

Of course, what is interesting in his analysis is his investment in the mechanisms of discourse in post-structuralist theory, specifically in Michel Foucault's concept of discourse, as presented in his two books, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and *Discipline and Punish*. Michel Foucault raised questions about the source of the power enjoyed by discourse: is it its own source, or is its power coupled with the political, social, or epistemological institution? Thus, he does not separate discourse and power; rather, they are intertwined in the manner Edward Said found while studying Orientalism as a discourse or an organized system of knowledge. This system was able to produce strict rules regarding the way to deal with the Orient, serving the image of the superior, civilized, and powerful West. "This is precisely what was reflected in literary production—novels in particular—and thus discourse is what shapes the consciousness of the addressee and directs it in this direction or that, and it is what determines his relationships with things, people, and situations, and the nature of his positions toward things, people, and situations, making him accept what he accepts from them and reject what he rejects"(40).

"Said was keen in Orientalism to view knowledge as a moment among the moments of power; knowledge, in his view, is not a mere cold consciousness of the world, but rather an adaptation of the world, its subjugation, and its reconstruction"(41).

"The supreme purpose that Said aims for in his endeavor to fathom the relationship between power and knowledge, and to root the latter in the former, is to problematize this relationship and consider Orientalist discourse as more than just knowledge. Focusing attention on Orientalism was, for me, a partnership between discursive textuality, archivability, and worldly power, with each serving as an index to the other and a departure from it. Orientalism is an organized discourse, and accordingly, it is written knowledge; but being directly in the world and about the world, it is more than knowledge—it is power. For the Oriental, Orientalism is the influential and effective knowledge that brought him textually to the West, which occupied the West and extracted its human resources with its assistance"(42). Edward Said attempted in "this massive project—for which we will find continuity in his other work, *Culture and Imperialism* (1993)—to prove that internal consistency of Orientalism and the ideas it produced about the Orient, regardless of how close or far this knowledge was from the reality of the Orient. On the other hand, he wanted to reveal the driving and controlling force in Orientalism, noting that he confirmed that the European discourse on the Orient was built on what Friedrich Nietzsche calls the will to power, domination, and subjugation. Said adds: 'And I believe that the great value of Orientalism lies in its being evidence of European-American dominance over the Orient rather than being a truthful discourse about the Orient... Nevertheless, we must respect and try to realize the cohesive power of Orientalist discourse, its tightly intertwined bonds, its

extremely close connections with political, economic, and social institutions that grant it power, and its supreme ability to persist"(43).

"Bringing the Orient out of the unknown into the known has a purpose, then, which is to reassure and comfort, in addition to giving, above that, a sense of power; it is the feeling of fear that arouses and excites the instinct of control in the Western human, and as Nietzsche says, the instinct of fear is what impels us to know"(44). Indeed, Edward Said's experience sketches a model for this cosmopolitan intellectual who lived the anxiety of placelessness and simultaneously resisted narrow nationalist feelings, finding in writing and language his home that absorbs all human feelings, while his defense of the Palestinian right to the land was a defense of human dignity wherever it exists, and a bold, humane attempt to make the voices of the marginalized resonate across the world.

3- Nietzsche and Mohammed Arkoun:

The debate between religious reason and scientific reason is what Arkoun's writings revolve around on the one hand, as well as casting some light and clarification on the current practices of Islamic thought on the other hand. Within the framework of this debate and through it, Mohammed Arkoun sees the necessity for religious reason to transcend traditional practices, which were confined—in the event that religious thought faced a scientific objection—to adopting two positions regarding that: either rejecting the validity of the scientific objection and declaring the priority and preference of religious inference, or declaring the separation of discourse between religion and science despite their connection, even though the topics and subjects of debate in both positions do not depart from the themes of political and social discourse, such as human rights, social justice, the woman question, and other topics close to the same discourse. We will initiate the discussion about Mohammed Arkoun through his employment of the critical issue "genealogy in the Islamic epistemological heritage with the aim of introducing the quality of relativity into inherited systems of knowledge and constructing systems liberated from closed dogmatic systems"(45).

Arkoun attributes "the failure of renewal attempts to the absence of rigorous critical or historical analysis, at a time when the sacred and ideological charge remained dominant. There is no escape for us, if we wish to reclaim heritage, from returning, through critical practice, to humanism, or the trend of humanization, where man was the center of existence and the dialogue of values—a matter that aided the development of Arab-Islamic civilization at that time. However, with the dominance of the theological trend starting from the Middle Ages to our present day, the Arab-Islamic mind began to lose its critical nature, which became reverential and sanctifying, with no place in it for man or history. This critical nature, which Arab thought has come to lack, is the only way to overcome the negatives of the self and discover this heritage, about which we know nothing; for the critical and

scientific study of heritage is alone capable of revealing its positive aspects, demonstrating its true value, and opening the way to overcome its negatives that still hinder the renaissance of Arabs and Muslims in general"(46). Perhaps "Arkoun's insistence on applying the method is the fragility that characterizes classical Islamic studies"(47).

Likewise, Arkoun directed critique at Islamic studies of Islamic heritage. What flaws these historians is writing a narrative, descriptive history of sects or religious groups without analyzing and deconstructing them from within; through this, according to Arkoun, we lack historical methodology, and for this reason, he considered himself a historian before being a philosopher, which reminds us of the historical sense in Nietzsche(48).

Furthermore, Arkoun worked on employing "Nietzschean will to power in his works to unveil the knowledge in Islamic heritage that aims for power and the establishment of cultural systems of enslavement; hence, the absolute truth it claims becomes mere hypocrisy concealing the hidden will to power behind religion"(49). Arkoun's critical project is an invitation to Ijtihad and renewal, but not in Islamic thought as he claims, but rather in Orientalist thought; for he, as mentioned, plays the role of Orientalism from within to prove what Orientalists proved from the outside. Perhaps this is what made him assure his reader of his Islamic belonging, but without forgetting his ideological commitment and loyalty. Thus, "Arkoun appears faithful to the Western version through these claims; he is not content with merely promoting them, but considers them a refuge and salvation to which the Arab self resorts to overcome the ordeal of disconnection from heritage, taking it as an alternative reference that eases its alienation and torments. When he calls for this openness, he stipulates that the self transition from the stage of awareness, critique, and using what accords with the specificity of the self, to the stage of assimilation where there is surrender and detachment"(50).

In this way, the desire for hegemony becomes the engine of this knowledge. On this basis, according to Arkoun, we ought to attend to matters from a historical rather than ideal perspective by linking them to political, economic, and technological transformations; upon examining them, we find in them traces of hegemony resulting from power. Here, it seems to us that Arkoun is profoundly influenced by Nietzsche. From this, absolute truth according to Arkoun—just as it is with Nietzsche—becomes merely the pursuit of imposing a specific system, which led Arkoun to negate the religious orientation in Islamic thought, because there is no single, universal Islam; rather, knowledge reflects religious texts, as the meaning of things alters according to the alteration of interpreting forces(51).

"And if Arkoun attributed the conflict between religious reason and scientific reason to the conflict between two types of minds or two different types of epistemological practice, Ali Harb attributed

the conflict to a conflict between two kinds of minds in understanding and interpreting the text. In contrast, Taha Abderrahmane worked on establishing a theoretical model of intellectual activity consisting of three distinct yet overlapping and complementary levels of minds"(52).

Conclusion:

Based on the foregoing, Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics reveals itself as a decisive turning point and a radical epistemological shift in the trajectory of contemporary philosophy, both Western and Arab. His deconstruction of metaphysical structures, employment of the genealogical method, and critique of nihilism contributed to undermining rationalist logocentrism and the illusions of fixed origins, paving the way for the emergence of "post-metaphysical philosophy." This rupture manifested in the West through Heidegger's reformulation of the question of Being, Derrida's deconstruction of logocentrism, and Foucault's exposure of the intricate connection between power and knowledge.

This epistemological earthquake did not stop at the borders of the Western milieu; rather, it found a fertile echo in contemporary Arab thought. Arab thinkers borrowed Nietzschean tools—directly or through postmodern intermediaries—to deconstruct traditional structures and closed ideologies. This was embodied in the rehabilitation of the self and freedom with Badawi, the deconstruction of the structure of Western logocentrism and the will to dominance in Orientalist discourse with Said, leading to the exposure of the foundational mechanisms of religious reason and the displacement of historical orthodoxies with Arkoun.

Ultimately, this study answers its central problematique by affirming that the Nietzschean critique was not merely negative destruction; rather, it constituted a liberatory horizon that provided contemporary philosophy, in both Western and Arab spheres, with a conceptual and critical apparatus to rethink the self, history, and meaning outside the enclosures of reification and transcendent concepts.

Footnotes

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- (28) Ibid., pp. 47–48.
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